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1 Introduction
When looking for service, consumers want the best and to avoid the worst. But telling these apart,
and from service that lies between these extremes, is not always straightforward, particularly when
it comes to evaluating services provided by organisations charged with serving the public. There are
two key elements that complicate assessment of how well public sector organisations are doing their
job (Dixit, 2002; Besley and Ghatak, 2003). First, they lack a single overarching objective against
which performance can be assessed. Instead, they pursue multiple objectives and this requires
performance measurement along a range of performance dimensions. These objectives may conflict,
such that higher performance along one dimension may come at the expense of performance along
another. Second, they typically serve several stakeholders, including those using services, tax-payers,
regulatory bodies and politicians. The values that stakeholders attach to objectives are often not
known and unlikely to be identical (Smith, 2002; Propper and Wilson, 2012; Devlin and Sussex,
2011).
The lack of a set of common, explicit valuations for each performance dimension makes it difficult
to construct a single, composite performance measure. The empirical literature has addressed this
problem in different ways. Some performance evaluations restrict assessment to those dimensions
for which explicit valuations have been expressed. Examples include Timbie, Newhouse et al.
(2008), Timbie and Normand (2008) and Karnon et al. (2013), which translate hospital mortality
estimates into monetary units using the expressed valuation of a statistical life. The shortcoming of
this approach is that performance dimensions which lack explicit valuations are omitted from the
analysis.
Alternatively, analysts either choose a set of weights, or implement pre-defined scoring algorithms
such as equal weighting, or derive weights from the data using approaches based on item response
theory (Landrum, Bronskill and Normand, 2000; Landrum, Normand and Rosenheck, 2003; Daniels
and Normand, 2006; Teixeira-Pinto and Normand, 2008), data envelopment analysis (Dowd et al.,
2014), and ad-hoc econometric specifications (Chua, Palangkaraya and Yong, 2010). However, such
practice conflicts with one of the key tenets of economic welfare theory, namely that stakeholders are
the best judges of their preferences (Smith and Street, 2005; Boadway and Bruce, 1984). There is
no guarantee that weights imposed by analysts, however these are arrived at, match the preferences
of all stakeholders. Consequently, those being assessed might legitimately question the validity of
the generated composite score.
A growing literature in health economics has been concerned with multidimensional performance
assessment of healthcare providers that avoids the need for a composite measure, see e.g. Hall and
Hamilton (2004), Hauck and Street (2006), Gutacker, Bojke et al. (2013), Kruse and Christensen
(2013), Ha¨kkinen et al. (2014), Street et al. (2014) and Portrait, Galie¨n and Berg (2016). This
involves analysing performance against each dimension individually and then combining the results
into a performance profile or balanced score card. In doing so, it makes explicit how healthcare
providers perform on each performance dimension and how these dimensions correlate. However,
the fundamental problem remains: performance profiles cannot be ranked and so it remains unclear
which organisations excel or perform poorly across the board.
We seek to overcome this limitation by using dominance criteria to judge performance. Dom-
inance criteria have been employed previously to assess ranking uncertainty associated with the
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weights used to construct a composite indicator of healthcare performance (Schang et al., 2016)
but, to the best of our knowledge, such criteria have not been applied when evaluating performance
simultaneously across multiple dimensions. The concept of dominance is attractive in that it allows
comparison of multidimensional performance profiles under relatively weak assumptions about
stakeholders’ utility functions. Indeed, the only requirement is that a judgement can be made about
whether the marginal utility of an achievement is positive or negative and that this qualitative
judgement applies to all stakeholders. We believe this to be a reasonable pre-requisite in most
contexts.
We illustrate our approach using data about providers of hip replacement surgery in the
English NHS during the period April 2009 to March 2012. Performance is assessed along four
performance dimensions: inpatient length of stay (‘efficiency’), waiting times (‘access to care’),
28-day readmission rates and improvements in patient-reported health status after surgery (both
‘clinical quality’), all of which have been the focus of recent health policy in England. We estimate
multivariate multilevel models to account for the clustering of patients in hospitals and exploit the
correlation of performance across dimensions (Zellner, 1962; Hauck and Street, 2006). Empirical
Bayes estimates of the provider-specific posterior means and variance-covariance matrices are used
to classify hospitals into three categories: dominant, dominated, and non-comparable.
The primary aim of this paper is to demonstrate how to apply dominance criteria to multidi-
mensional performance assessment of public sector organisations. In the meeting this aim, we also
demonstrate how to construct multivariate (rather than univariate) hypothesis tests of performance
estimates that account for correlation between dimensions and thereby achieve correct coverage
probabilities. Besides this, we make three further contributions to the empirical literature on
hospital performance. First, we provide evidence about the correlations, and thus the potential for
trade-offs, between different objectives that healthcare providers typically face. Previous research
has focused predominantly on the association between hospital costs and mortality (see Hussey,
Wertheimer and Mehrotra (2013) for a review), largely ignoring other important dimensions such as
waiting times to access services or improvements in patients’ health-related quality of life. Second,
in contrast to previous studies conducted at hospital level (e.g. Martin and Smith, 2005), we use
individual-level data and focus on a single homogeneous patient population, thereby reducing the
risk of ecological fallacy. Third, by exploiting novel data on pre-operative health status and by
accouting for patients selecting into hospital we are better able to identify the true impact that
providers have on performance measures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we set out the assessment
framework in conceptual terms. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and section 4
describes our data. We report results in section 5 and offer concluding comments in section 6.
2 Multivariate performance assessment using dominance criteria
Assume that a regulator, acting on behalf of stakeholders, seeks to determine the performance of a
number of similar providers, such as hospitals, police forces or schools. Let there be k = 1, . . . ,K
performance dimensions with observed achievement Yk. Performance is determined by two factors,
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those under the control of the provider θk and external production constraints Xk, so that
Yk = f(Xk, θk) (1)
for each provider.
The parameter θk can be interpreted as the provider’s contribution to performance k over and
above the circumstances in which they operate. This parameter is generally not directly observable
and thus forms the target for inferences about performance within the framework of yardstick
competition (Shleifer, 1985).
Each stakeholder derives utility from the performance of a provider so that U = U(θ1, . . . , θK),
which is assumed to be monotonic in θk over the range of realistic values for all k ∈ K. The regulator
has only limited knowledge about the characteristics of this utility function. This may be because
there are multiple stakeholders with heterogeneous and/or unknown preferences. More specifically,
the regulator has no information about the marginal utility ∂U/∂θk that each stakeholder derives,
and hence the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) at which each stakeholder is willing to trade
off performance on one dimension against that on another, i.e. MRSk,k′ = ∂θk/∂θk′ for k 6= k
′
.
However, the regulator has knowledge about the sign of ∂U/∂θk, i.e. whether achievements are
expressed positively or negatively. To simplify the exposition, we assume that performance can be
expressed so that utility increases in θk.
If only one performance dimension is assessed (K = 1) or the MRS across multiple dimensions
are known then achievements can be expressed as unidimensional (composite) scores. The regulator
can then conduct either a relative or absolute assessment of performance. The first involves ranking
providers j ∈ J according to their relative achievement θj , where θj > θj′ implies U(θj) > U(θj′ )
for j 6= j
′
. This will result in a complete and transitive ordering of providers, assuming no ties. One
can then designate some providers as performing well or poorly based on their relative ranking, e.g.
whether they fall within a given percentile of the distribution Goldstein and Spiegelhalter (1996).
Alternatively, providers can be classified based on θj − θ
∗ being larger or smaller than zero, where
θ∗ denotes an absolute performance standard to which providers are compared1, this being the
approach to assessing standardised mortality after surgery (Spiegelhalter, 2005; National Clinical
Audit Advisory Group, 2011), train punctuality (NetworkRail, 2016), or minimum standards for
pupil achievement (Department of Education, 2016).
When multiple performance dimensions are assessed (K ≥ 2) and the MRS are unknown, a
complete and transitive ordering of providers is no longer guaranteed and relative assessments are
unfeasible. As a result, it becomes impossible to identify providers that perform well or poorly
in terms of stakeholders’ aggregate utility. However, some combinations of performance levels
may be strictly preferable (dominant) or inferior (dominated) to other combinations, leading to a
partial ordering of provider. As an analogue to the Pareto dominance criteria we can formalise the
following general dominance classification rules2:
1Note that, when no external standards are specified, performance standards are typically based on the relative
performance of all organisations (Shleifer, 1985). Hence, a provider will be considered to perform well when observed
performance is better than a reference value derived from all providers. In many cases, this reference value is simply
the average across all providers, i.e. θ∗ = 1
J
∑
θj .
2Devlin, Parkin and Browne (2010) propose the use of a similar classification system to compare EQ-5D health
profiles over time without resorting to making strong assumptions about patients’ preferences.
4
A provider either
1. dominates the comparator if θjk ≥ θj′k for all k ∈ K and θjk > θj′k for some k ∈ K, or
2. is dominated by the comparator if θjk ≤ θj′k for all k ∈ K and θjk < θj′k for some k ∈ K, or
3. is non-comparable to the comparator if θjk ≥ θj′k for some k ∈ K and θjk ≤ θj′k for the
remaining k ∈ K,
where j 6= j
′
and θj′k denotes the performance level of the comparator, which may be either relative
to other providers or to an absolute performance standard θ∗.
3 Methodology
3.1 Empirical approach
The aims of the empirical analysis are to obtain estimates of provider performances θjk and of
their correlation across each of the K = 1, . . . , 4 performance dimensions, and to classify providers
according to the dominance classification set out in section 2. We estimate multivariate multilevel
models (MVMLMs) with achievement Yijk observed for individuals served i = 1, . . . , nj who are
clustered in j providers j = 1, . . . , J . Multilevel (i.e. random intercept) models have become a staple
tool in the field of performance assessment and allow us to i) adjust performance for differences across
providers in the characteristics of those served (i.e. risk adjustment), ii) decompose unexplained
variation in achievement into random (within-provider) variation at individual level and systematic
(between-provider) variation at provider level, and iii) obtain more reliable (precision-weighted or
shrunken) estimates of performance (Goldstein, 1997).
The multivariate nature of the data is taken into account through correlated random terms at
each level of the hierarchy (Zellner, 1962; Hauck and Street, 2006). Allowing for correlation across
dimensions is beneficial for several reasons. First, we can construct multivariate hypothesis tests of
parameters of interest that take into account the correlation between dimensions and achieve correct
coverage probabilities. We discuss this in detail in Section 3.2. Second, we obtain more efficient
estimates of relevant parameters if either the components of Xijk differ across k or non-identity
link functions are employed for at least some of the regression equations. Finally, by utilising a
maximum likelihood estimator, missing data for any particular performance domain can be assumed
missing at random conditional on all modelled covariates and observed performance (Little and
Rubin, 1987; Goldstein, 1986).
In this application, we consider four dimensions of performance of which two are continuous
and two are binary variables. In order to ascertain the conditional normality of error terms as
imposed by the MVN assumption, we apply appropriate transformations (e.g. logarithmic) for the
continuous variables and specify probit models for the binary variables, considering these as the
observed realisation of a latent truncated Gaussian variable.
The empirical model to be estimated is specified as
Y ∗ijk = αk +X
′
ijkβk + θjk + ǫijk (2)
with Y ∗ijk = f(Yijk) for k = 1, 2 and
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Yijk =
{
1 if Y ∗ijk > 0
0 if Y ∗ijk ≤ 0
for k = 3, 4.
The variable Yijk denotes observed performance, Y
∗
ijk is the corresponding latent underlying
variable, f(.) is a transformation function chosen to normalise the conditional distribution of ǫijk,
Xijk is a vector of explanatory variables whose components may differ across dimensions, αk is an
intercept term, θjk denotes a random effect at provider level and ǫijk denotes the random error
term at individual level. Both random terms are assumed to be MVN distributed with mean vector
zero and a K ×K variance-covariance matrix, so that θjk ∼MVN(0,Σ) with
E(θjk) = 0
var(θjk) = τ
2
k
cov(θjk, θjk′ ) = ρθτkτk′
for all k 6= k
′
.
and similarly ǫijk ∼MVN(0,Ω) with
E(ǫijk) = 0
var(ǫijk) = σ
2
k for k = 1, 2
var(ǫijk) = 1 for k = 3, 4
cov(ǫijk, ǫijk′ ) = ρǫσkσk′
for all k 6= k
′
. The model reduces to a set of univariate models if all off-diagonal elements of Σ and
Ω are zero, i.e. achievements are uncorrelated conditional on observed patient factors.
3.2 Classification of provider effects and multivariate hypothesis tests
We compare providers against a common performance standard, which can be specified externally
or set at some point along the observed distribution of performance such as the top decile (Burgess
et al., 2000). For illustrative purposes we define the standard as the expected performance of
a (hypothetical) provider of average performance αk, i.e. the conditional mean. We base our
assessment of provider performance on estimates of θjk, which represent the provider-specific
deviation from this benchmark and can be obtained using Empirical Bayes predictions techniques
(Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2009). A provider’s dominance classification is determined by
comparing its estimated adjusted achievements to that of the performance standard across all
performance dimensions simultaneously. This leads to three possible classifications: dominant,
dominated, or non-comparable.
We quantify uncertainty around these possible classifications by taking a Bayesian perspective
and calculating the posterior probability that a given provider truly dominates [is dominated;
non-comparable]. This involves calculating the area under the MVN probability density function
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that covers each of the three possibilities, for each provider3. Figure 1a illustrates this for the
two-dimensional case with two highly correlated bivariate normal distributed achievements (ρ = 0.6).
The centroid of the density is given by X and the ellipse shows the central 95% of this density. The
density is dissected by two lines which intersect at the benchmark. The density covered by the areas
A and B equals the probability of dominating or being dominated by the benchmark, whereas the
density covered by area C gives the probability for the non-comparable outcome. To calculate these
probabilities, we follow the simulation approach of O’Hagan, Stevens and Montmartin (2000). This
involves drawing S repeated samples from the MVN posterior distribution of the provider-specific
Empirical Bayes estimates of the mean vector θj and associated variance-covariance matrix Σj .
We then apply the dominance criteria to each simulation and calculate posterior probabilities by
averaging across simulations. Formally,
Pr(dominant |J = j) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
K∏
k=1
I(θsjk > 0) (3)
Pr(dominated |J = j) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
K∏
k=1
I(θsjk < 0) (4)
and by construction
Pr(non-comparable |J = j) = 1− (Pr(dominant |J = j) + Pr(dominated |J = j)) (5)
where S is the total number of simulations, θsjk denotes the simulated provider-effect in simulation
s, and I is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the condition is true and zero
otherwise. This approach has several advantages over a series of univariate assessments. Most
importantly, it accounts for the correlation between performance dimensions and thus achieves
correct coverage of the confidence region (Briggs and Fenn, 1998). Figure 1b illustrates the difference
between probability statements if performances on both dimensions are incorrectly assumed to
be independent. The dashed line outlines the resulting ‘confidence box’, which is formed by the
end points of two independent 95% confidence intervals that are adjusted for multiple testing.
Furthermore, because we make probability statements about a single quantity of interest, the
provider’s location in the k-dimensional performance space, we avoid such issues of multiple testing.
3.3 Risk-adjustment
Perhaps the primary reason that observed achievements differ across hospitals is because they
treat different types of patients. Accounting for these differences may not be necessary in contexts
where funds have been allocated to achieve a standard level of outcome using some form of risk-
adjusted reimbursement formulae (Smith, 2003; Jacobs, Smith and Street, 2006; Schang et al.,
2016). However, in many health care systems, hospitals are subject to a prospective payment system
which uses fairly crude payment categories to reimburse hospitals for differences in patients (Kobel
et al., 2011). If the payment categories fail to account for all observable risks driving variation in
3Our problem is similar to that encountered in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, where one wishes to
compute the probability that a new treatment is cost-effective for a given level of willingness to pay (Van Hout et al.,
1994; Briggs and Fenn, 1998; O’Hagan, Stevens and Montmartin, 2000).
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Legend: X denotes the centroid of the density. The solid ellipsoid line shows the inner 95% of the bivariate density with ρ = 0.6, whereas the
dashed line denotes the density covered by the confidence box that is formed by two independent 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal and
vertical axes intersect at the benchmark and dissect each density into four areas, where the covered density of the area reflects the probability
of dominating the benchmark (A), being dominated by the benchmark (B) or being non-comparable to the benchmark (C) (left panel).
Figure 1: Example of area of probability density plane covered under different assumptions about the dependence of achievement scores
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outcomes, as in this context, risk-adjustment will be necessary.
We perform risk-adjustment for three of the four performance dimensions. No risk-adjustment
was performed in the analysis of waiting times because hospitals are expected to manage their
waiting lists so as to balance high priority cases and those with less urgent need for admission
(Gutacker, Siciliani and Cookson, 2016). But, for the other three dimensions, observed performance
is likely to be related to patient characteristics. We constructed a ‘core’ set of risk-adjustment
variables that are applied to all three dimensions, and also considered additional characteristics
for each dimension. Preliminary modelling of potential risk-adjusters was conducted on the basis
of univariate multilevel regression models and LOWESS plots. All continuous variables were
first added linearly to the regression model and we subsequently explored whether squared terms
improved the fit of the model.
3.4 Endogeneity due to selection of provider
Patients in the English NHS have a right to choose their provider of inpatient care for most elective
procedures. This may lead to endogeneity bias in the estimates of hospital performance if both the
choice of hospital4 and the level of service provided for an individual patient are driven by common
underlying factors (e.g. unobserved severity, health literacy) that are not controlled for as part of
Xijk (Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999; Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003).
In order to test for bias due to patient selection and to obtain correct estimates of hospital
performance we estimate the model in (2) and perform two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) as
suggested by Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008). In the first stage, we estimate a multinomial
model where choice of hospital is assumed to be determined by the straight-line distance5 from
the patient’s residence to the hospital, an unobserved patient effect and random noise. Distance
is commonly chosen as an instrumental variable as it is a major driver of hospital choice and is
exogenously determined, on the reasonable assumption that patients do not choose where to live
based on hospital performance (Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999). The residual from this regression
captures both the unobserved patient effect and random noise. In the second stage, we enter this
residual as an additional regressor into each of the four regression models. If the coefficients on
the first-stage residuals are statistically significantly different from zero this provides evidence of
selection bias and the need for 2SRI adjustments (Terza, Basu and Rathouz, 2008).
4 Data
Our sources of data are the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) and the Patient Reported Outcome
Measures (PROM) survey. HES contains detailed inpatient records for all patients receiving
NHS-funded care in England. The PROM survey invites all patients undergoing unilateral hip
replacement to report their health status before and six months after surgery using the Oxford Hip
4Selection may also arise if providers cream-skim.
5We also include distance2 and distance3 as well as an indicator for whether the hospital is the closest alternative.
Hospitals with less than 30 patients were removed from the choice set. The patient’s residence was approximated
by the centroid of the lower super output area (LSOA) in which the patient lives. LSOAs are designed to include
approximately 1,500 inhabitants, i.e. they are substantially smaller than US ZIP codes.
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Score (OHS)6 (Dawson et al., 1996). The inpatient records are linked to survey responses using
unique anonymised patient identifiers.
We extract information on all patients undergoing unilateral hip replacement (identified through
the primary procedure code; Department of Health (2008)) in the period April 2009 to March
20127. Patients were excluded if they were aged 17 or younger at the time of admission, underwent
revision surgery, or were admitted as emergencies or day-cases. Patients were also excluded if they
attended a provider that treated fewer than 30 patients in the same financial year.
For each patient, we extract information about demographic and medical characteristics, the
admission process and the hospital stay. The HES data are used to construct three performance
measures: i) inpatient length of stay (top-coded at the 99th percentile), ii) emergency re-admission
within 28 days of discharge for any condition (coded as 0=not re-admitted, 1=re-admitted), and iii)
waiting time, measured as the time elapsed between the surgeon’s decision to admit and the actual
admission to hospital. Waiting time is categorised into waits of no more than 18 weeks (=0) and
waits exceeding 18 weeks (=1) to mirror the contemporaneous waiting time performance standard
in the English NHS8.
The fourth measure, post-operative health status, is derived from the PROM survey, and is
based on the OHS. This is a reliable and validated measure of health status for hip replacement
patients and consists of twelve questions regarding functioning and pain. For each item, the patient
is asked to respond on a five-item scale. These items are summed to generate an index score ranging
from 0 (worst) to 48 (best). Pre-operative survey responses are collected by paper questionnaire
during the last outpatient appointment or on the day of admission, whereas follow-up responses are
collected via mailed survey to the patient’s home address. Participation in the PROM survey is
voluntary for patients but mandatory for all hospitals providing NHS-funded care to these patients.
Approximately 60% of patients returned completed pre-operative questionnaires that can be linked
to their HES record (Gutacker, Street et al., 2015). These patients tend to be slightly older, less
likely to be male and more likely to have been admitted as an emergency in the past year; see
Appendix Table A1 for full descriptive statistics. Implicitly we treat those observations to be
missing completely at random9, which is in line with the official adjustment methodology of the
national PROM programme. We return to this point in the discussion.
Based on previous research (Gutacker, Bojke et al., 2013; Street et al., 2014), we identified a set
of ‘core’ patient characteristics that were included in all risk-adjustment models: age, sex, primary
diagnosis (coded as osteoarthritis (ICD-10: M15-19), rheumatoid arthritis (ICD-10: M05-06), or
other), comorbidity burden as measured by individual Elixhauser comorbidity conditions recorded
6All patients are also invited to fill in the EuroQol-5D (EQ-5D) questionnaire, a generic health-related quality
of life instrument (Brooks, 1996). However, we focus on the OHS as it is better approximated by a continuous
distribution and we do not seek to make comparisons across disease areas. Furthermore, the OHS is the relevant
outcome measure for the newly introduced best practice tariff (a pay-for-performance scheme) in the English NHS
that was introduced in April 2014 (Monitor and NHS England, 2013). Previous comparisons have demonstrated that
performance assessments based on the EQ-5D and OHS lead to similar conclusions (Neuburger et al., 2013).
7HES records activity at the level of ‘finished consultant episodes’ (FCEs) and we link consecutive episodes within
the hospital stay and across hospital transfers to form continuous inpatient spells (CIPS). A CIPS is deemed complete
when the patient is discharged from one provider and not re-admitted to another provider within 2 days.
8The current performance standard is defined in terms of proportion of patients exceeding a waiting time of 18
weeks between the GPs referral and the admission.
9Hence, the probability of being included in our estimation sample is entirely random and determined neither by
(un-)observed patient or provider characteristics, nor by the outcome of interest.
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in secondary diagnosis fields (Elixhauser et al., 1998), number of emergency admissions to hospital
within the last year (coded as 0=none, 1=one or more), and patients’ approximate socio-economic
status based on level of income deprivation in the patient’s neighbourhood of residence as measured
by the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2004 (Noble et al., 2006). The pre-operative OHS score from
the PROM survey is used to control for initial health status at admission. We also constructed other
risk-adjustment variables from the PROM survey, namely the duration of problems, and whether
the patient lives alone, considered herself disabled, or required help filling in the questionnaire.
In the length of stay model, we controlled for the healthcare resource group (HRG, the English
equivalent of Diagnosis Related Groups) to which the patient was allocated and which form the
basis of the prospective payment system used to reimburse English hospitals (Grasˇicˇ, Mason and
Street, 2015).
All continuous variables were mean centred to facilitate interpretation of the intercept. Our
exploratory work confirmed the importance of all core variables in explaining variation in each
of the three performance dimensions. Time with symptoms, assistance and living alone did not
explain variation in the probability of being re-admitted and were thus not included in the final
model for that dimension. Non-linear effects were found for age (all performance dimensions) and
pre-treatment health status (only length of stay and post-operative OHS).
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
The estimation sample consists of 95,955 patients treated in 252 hospitals during April 2009 and
March 2012. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Patients are on average 67 years old, and 41%
of patients are male. The majority (68%) report having had problems with their hip joint for 1
to 5 years, with 8% experiencing symptoms for more than 10 years and 14% for less than 1 year,
while 39% say they have a disability, and 27% live alone.
Figure 2 illustrates the empirical distributions of the performance variables on their untrans-
formed scales. The average post-operative OHS is 38.5 (SD=9.2) and the average length of stay
is 5.4 days (SD=3.8), with both distributions showing substantial skew. About 17.5% of patients
waited longer than 18 weeks to be admitted to hospital and 5.2% were readmitted to hospital
within 28 days of discharge. There is a substantial proportion of missing responses in terms of
post-operative OHS (15.2%) and, to lesser degrees, waiting time (4.0%) and length of stay (0.1%).
Conversely, emergency re-admission status is recorded for all patients.
5.2 Hospital heterogeneity and correlation between performance dimensions
From the estimated variance-covariance matrices Σ and Ω we can calculate the correlation across
performance estimates10. The lower off-diagonal in Table 2 shows the correlation between perform-
ance estimates at provider level, whereas the upper off-diagonal shows the correlation at patient
10With the exception of waiting times, estimates are risk-adjusted. The estimated coefficients on risk-adjustment
variables and associated standard errors are not the focus of this paper and are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The first-stage residuals from the selection equation are jointly statistically significant (χ2(4) = 14.97; p<0.01)
when entered into the main equations, suggesting that self-selection into hospital may bias performance estimates if
uncontrolled for (see Table A3 in the Appendix for first-stage estimates).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Description N Mean SD
Achievement measures (Dependent variables)
Post-operative OHS 81,336 38.50 9.21
Length of stay (in days) 95,878 5.36 3.75
Waiting time > 18 weeks 92,154 0.17 0.38
28-day emergency readmission 95,955 0.05 0.22
Patient characteristics (Control variables)
Patient age (in years) 95,955 67.43 11.29
Patient gender (1=male, 0=female) 95,955 0.41 0.49
Pre-operative OHS 95,955 17.66 8.28
Primary diagnosis
Osteoarthritis 95,955 0.93 0.25
Rheumatoid arthritis 95,955 0.01 0.07
Other 95,955 0.06 0.24
Number of Elixhauser comorbidities
0 95,955 0.35 0.48
1 95,955 0.29 0.45
2-3 95,955 0.26 0.44
4+ 95,955 0.10 0.31
Previously admitted as an emergency (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.08 0.28
Socio-economic status 95,955 0.12 0.09
Disability (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.39 0.49
Living alone (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.27 0.44
Assistance (1=yes, 0=no) 95,955 0.21 0.41
Symptom duration
< 1 year 95,955 0.14 0.35
1 - 5 years 95,955 0.68 0.47
6 - 10 years 95,955 0.11 0.31
> 10 years 95,955 0.08 0.26
Healthcare Resource Group
HB12C - category 2 without CC 95,955 0.77 0.42
HB11C - category 1 without CC 95,955 0.10 0.29
HB12B - category 2 with CC 95,955 0.07 0.26
HB12A - category 2 with major CC 95,955 0.04 0.19
HB11B - category 1 with CC 95,955 0.01 0.11
other 95,955 0.02 0.12
Legend: N = Number of observations, SD = Standard deviation; OHS = Oxford
Hip Score; CC = complications or co-morbidities.
Notes: Healthcare Resource Groups refer to major hip procedures for non-trauma
patients in category 1 (HB12x) or category 2 (HB11x). Socio-economic status
is approximated by the % of neighbourhood residents claiming income benefits.
This characteristic is measured at neighbourhood level (lower super output area
(LSOA)).
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Figure 2: Empirical distribution of unadjusted achievement scores
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Table 2: Correlation between performance dimensions
Performance dimension (1) (2) (3) (4)
Length of stay (1) 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.02
Post-operative OHS (2) -0.34 1.00 -0.02 -0.07
Waiting time > 18 wks (3) 0.26 -0.31 1.00 0.00
28-day emergency readmission (4) 0.03 -0.49 0.16 1.00
Notes: Lower triangle reports the correlation between random effects at
provider level, whereas upper triangle (in italics) reports the correlation
between random effects (i.e. the idiosyncratic error term) at patient
level. Bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significantly
different from zero at the 95% level.
level. Bold numbers indicate that the correlation coefficient is statistically significantly different
from zero (p<0.05; Huber-White standard errors).
There are significant correlations for four combinations of dimensions. Hospitals with shorter
length of stay also realise better post-operative health status for their patients (ρ = -0.34; SE =
0.067; p<0.001). This is consistent with findings from randomised controlled trials that tested
the effectiveness of so-called ‘fast track’ or ‘enhanced recovery’ pathways and found that hospitals
that mobilise patients sooner after surgery were able to discharge them quicker and achieve better
post-operative outcomes (Husted, Holm and Jacobsen, 2008; Larsen et al., 2008).
Hospitals that have a lower proportion of patients waiting more than 18 weeks to be admitted
also have a shorter length of stay (ρ = 0.26; SE = 0.065; p<0.001), suggesting better management
of capacity and of their waiting lists. This would be consistent with a queuing model of limited
bed capacity, where prospective patients cannot be admitted until current patients are discharged.
Hospitals that have better post-operative health outcomes also tend to have a lower proportion of
patients waiting for more than 18 weeks (ρ= -0.31; SE = 0.071; p<0.001). Finally, the correlation
between the probability of an emergency readmission within 28 days and post-operative health
status is negative and statistically significant (ρ = -0.49; SE = 0.078; p<0.001), which may indicate
that readmission has an adverse impact on health status.
Overall, these correlations indicate that inferences based on a series of univariate assessments
would likely be misleading and that our MVMLM is preferable for this empirical analysis of provider
performance.
We have conducted sensitivity analyses with respect two modelling choices (results are reported
in Appendix Tables A4 to A5). First, we restricted analysis to public (NHS) hospitals and excluded
private hospitals (so called ‘independent sector treatment centres’ (ISTCs)) as these may operate
under different production constraints. The estimated covariance terms in Σ are attenuated
somewhat and the correlations of waiting time with length of stay (p=0.174) and post-operative
health status (p=0.857) are no longer statistically significant.
Second, we included additional regressors based on patient risk factors averaged at hospital
level to correct for potential bias11 arising from correlation between Xij ’s and the hospital random
11This bias is likely to be small. We compared coefficient estimates from fixed and random effects estimators
using Hausman tests and found little practical difference between those estimates, although the tests all rejected
the assumption of unbiasedness for the random effects approach. This is likely to be due to our large sample, where
within effects swamp between effects and the Hausman test is over-powered. Results are available from the authors
on request.
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effects (Mundlak, 1978). Due to convergence problems, we restricted these additional regressors to
average patient age, pre-operative PROM score and level of income deprivation. Again, covariance
terms are smaller in size but remain statistically significant.
5.3 Hospital performance assessment
We now turn to the assessment of multidimensional hospital performance. Figure 3 shows the
location of each hospital in the four-dimensional performance space, where each panel presents
scatter plots for two dimensions. For all performance dimensions higher scores indicate better
performance.
We identify five dominant and eight dominated hospitals at a probability level of 90% (highlighted
dark grey). All dominant hospitals are private ISTCs that exclusively perform just planned
orthopaedic procedures, here marked as triangles, whereas all dominated hospitals are public NHS
hospitals, marked as circles, that provide a wider mix of services, including emergency care.12 Note
however that not all ISTCs are located in NE quadrant, and not all NHS hospitals are located
in the SW quadrant. We re-estimated the models and included an indicator variable for private
ownership and found that, on average, ISTCs performed better on all dimensions 13.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for dominant and dominated providers in the financial
year 2011/12. Both groups are comparable in terms of the annual volume of NHS-funded procedures
provided. This suggests that volume-outcome effects may be less important in explaining overall
performance differences. Conversely, we find that dominant providers operate in more competitive
markets as indicated by the lower Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This finding is consistent
with the theory of quality competition in price-regulated markets (Gaynor, Ho and Town, 2015).
Dominant providers may also be exploiting economies of scope: our specialisation index, which
reflects the dispersion of HRGs treated within the orthopaedic department of hospital j and
resembles a Gini index that is bounded between zero (=no specialisation) and one (=all patients of
hospital j fall into one HRG) (Daidone and D’Amico, 2009), suggests that good overall performance
is associated with more concentrated service delivery. Note, however, that these comparisons are
based on a small number of observations (J=13) and should be interpreted as associations.
Table 3: Characteristics of dominant and dominated providers (in 2011/12)
Dominant (J=5) Dominated (J=8)
Description Mean SD Mean SD
Annual volume of hip replacements 361.60 198.16 365.38 190.04
Ownership (1=private, 0=NHS) 1.00 - 0.00 -
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.60 0.05 0.78 0.07
HRG specialisation 0.73 0.13 0.15 0.03
12Approximately 30% of admissions treated by consultants working in Trauma & Orthopaedics in NHS hospitals
are classed as emergencies.
13Length of stay (beta=-0.100; SE = 0.020; p<0.001), post-operative health status (beta=1.205; SE = 0.157;
p<0.001), probability of being readmitted (beta=-0.084; SE = 0.072; p<0.001), and probability of waiting longer
than 18 weeks (beta=-0.820; SE = 0.030; p=0.007)
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Figure 3: Multidimensional performance estimates
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5.4 Comparison with approaches based on series of univariate probabilities
It is instructive to compare the results from our ‘full’ MVMLM assessment with two alternative
approaches: 1) a simple ‘univariate’ approach and 2) an ‘intermediate’ MVMLM regression that
takes into account the correlation between performance during the estimation stage but treats
performance estimates as independent. In both the simple and intermediate approaches a hospital is
judged to be dominant [dominated] if all four individual probabilities of exceeding [falling short of]
the benchmarks are greater or equal to a specified probability threshold (‘confidence box approach’).
We adopt a Bonferroni correction to adjust for these multiple comparisons.
Table 4 shows the number of hospitals identified as dominant/dominated under each of these
approaches. At a probability threshold of 90% (Pr∗ = 0.9), the univariate and intermediate
MVMLM both identify just one or two dominant and dominated providers, which is fewer than the
full MVMLM. The intermediate multivariate approach is generally more efficient than the univariate
approach. The full MVMLM approach is most efficient and discriminatory at any probability
threshold. The providers identified under each approach are always subsets of each other.
Table 4: Number of dominant/dominated providers under different estimation approaches and
assumptions about the correlation between performance dimensions
Probability
threshold Pr∗
(1) Univariate
(2) Intermediate
multivariate (3) Full multivariate
Dominant Dominated Dominant Dominated Dominant Dominated
0.50 5 8 7 10 24 30
0.80 2 3 5 5 12 18
0.90 1 1 2 2 5 8
0.99 0 0 0 1 1 1
(1) Univariate approach - separate univariate models are estimated for each of the four performance
dimensions.
(2) Intermediate multivariate approach - multivariate model is estimated and correlation between
performance dimensions is exploited in the estimation stage but ignored when forming probability
statements.
(3) Fully multivariate approach - see section 3.2 for details.
6 Discussion
Rarely are stakeholders explicit about the valuations they attach to different dimensions of per-
formance of organisations charged with serving the public, nor are these valuations likely to be
identical. This makes it challenging to construct a composite performance indicator appropriate
for all audiences. To circumvent this, we have set out a methodology for comparing providers in
terms of their performance across a range of dimensions in a way that does not require valuation
of each dimension and is consistent with economic theory. We extend previous literature by
employing dominance criteria to compare providers against a multidimensional benchmark, and
by constructing multivariate (rather than univariate) hypothesis tests of parameters that account
for correlation between dimensions and thereby achieve correct coverage probabilities. Failure to
perform multivariate tests can lead to incorrect inferences about multidimensional performance as
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we illustrate.
Dominance criteria have been adopted previously to assess ranking uncertainty related to the
weights used in the construction of a composite indicator of performance (Schang et al., 2016)
but our MVMLM offers two advantages over that study. First, Schang et al. do not account for
uncertainty associated with the performance estimates themselves whereas we are able to construct
confidence statements for each performance dimension. Second, composite measures have been
criticised because the aggregation of individual performance dimensions obscures where problems
lie, thereby risking inaction by the organisations being evaluated (Smith, 2002). By reporting each
performance dimension separately, the MVMLM approach offers greater transparency, indicating
which dimension of performance should be the focus of attention for each organisation.
We apply our MVMLM approach to study the performance of English providers of hip re-
placement surgery with respect to four dimensions, namely waiting time, length of stay, 28-day
emergency readmission, and patient-reported health status after surgery. There are two main
findings: First, performance is positively, albeit weakly, correlated across dimensions, which suggests
that achievements on one dimension need not be traded off against those on another. We stress
that these may not be causal estimates, although some of our findings confirm those of randomised
controlled trials conducted in routine care settings. Second, all providers that dominate the bench-
mark are private ISTCs, whereas those dominated by the benchmark are public NHS hospitals. We
do not believe that this is due to ISTCs treating easier cases, as we have controlled for a rich set of
risk-adjusters including, and unusually, pre-treatment health status. This finding also accords with
other studies which have found that ISTCs achieve better health outcomes than NHS hospitals
(Browne et al., 2008; Chard et al., 2011) and discharge patients earlier (Siciliani, Sivey and Street,
2013). As was hoped by those advocating the creation of treatment centres (House of Commons
Health Committee, 2006), better performance may be the result of a more stream-lined production
process, with specialisation in treating elective joint replacement patients yielding performance
advantages. The reasons for performance differences can rarely be ascertained definitively from
routine data, but our analytical approach identifies the handful of organisations at both ends of the
performance spectrum where deeper and more detailed investigation would be worthwhile.
The primary contribution of this work is methodological. We have laid out the rationale for
and demonstrated the feasibility of using dominance criteria to judge hospital performance across
multiple dimensions. The appeal of the dominance approach lies in the absence of strong assumptions
about various stakeholders’ utility functions and its ability to reduce multiple performance estimates
into a single assessment. However, this comes at a price. Because the approach requires providers
to perform better than the benchmark on all dimensions, there is no scope to compensate for
average or poor performance on one dimension through excellent performance on another. Moreover
one would expect the number of providers identified as dominant or dominated to decrease as
the number of dimensions under consideration increases (Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-Jimenez and
Smith, 1999). This is of course true for all multidimensional performance assessments — even those
that weigh achievements — but the effect is more pronounced in a dominance framework with its
stricter requirements.
Our framework can be extended to relax the requirements of strict dominance. While regulators
are unlikely to know the exact marginal rates of substitution for all stakeholders, they may be able
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to determine a reasonable range of likely values and rule out extreme cases. For example, it may be
uncontroversial to assume that all stakeholders would be willing to accept a very small increase in
waiting time (e.g. 0.5 days), in return for a large improvement in expected post-operative health
status (e.g. 8 points on the Oxford Hip Score). Our empirical framework can easily be extended to
allow boundaries on the possible values of the marginal rates of substitution. Dominance criteria
would then be applied within these boundaries.
A number of other extensions are possible. First, the statistical model can be extended to
non-normal (e.g. time-to-event, count) data by specifying generalised linear models or survival
models. These would include in their linear predictor provider and/or patient level random effects
that follow the same multivariate normal distribution as for the other outcomes (Teixeira-Pinto and
Normand, 2008; Gebregziabher et al., 2013; Verbeke et al., 2014). Other multivariate distributions
are possible as well, e.g. the multivariate gamma. Note, however, that the added complexity of such
models will often require the use of more flexible estimation techniques to evaluate the likelihood
such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation.
Second, while shrinkage estimators are commonly applied in the context of performance assess-
ment (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996; Ash et al., 2012) they have been criticised for being overly
conservative (Austin, Alter and Tu, 2003; Kalbfleisch and Wolfe, 2013). This is especially likely for
providers with smaller case-loads, with shrinkage moving them closer to the average and less likely
to be identified as statistically significant positive or negative performers. Analysts may thus prefer
to model provider effects using dummy variables, characterising uncertainty on the basis of the
variance-covariance matrix.
Finally, multiple imputation (MI) techniques are a useful extension to the maximum likelihood
framework when data on covariates are missing at random or to explore the impact of data missing
not at random as part of sensitivity analyses (Carpenter, Kenward and White, 2007; Carpenter
and Kenward, 2013). In our study non-response with respect to the Oxford Hip Score is the most
common reason for missing data, and other studies have shown that this is associated with patient
characteristics and varies systematically across providers (Hutchings, Neuburger, Grosse Frie et al.,
2012; Hutchings, Neuburger, Meulen et al., 2014; Gutacker, Street et al., 2015). Recently Gomes
et al. (2016) used an MI approach to explore the effect of missing pre- or post-operative Oxford Hip
Score data on provider performance estimates within our dataset and found these to be robust but
less efficient, i.e. flagging fewer positive and negative performers as statistically significant. The
estimates in this study, therefore, should be understood to be conservative.
In conclusion, in situations where the MRS are unknown or vary among stakeholders, the
dominance approach provides a tractable means of evaluating multidimensional performance of
public sector organisations.
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